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SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has recently expressed concerns about the 
use of earnings management to meet Wall Street earnings expectations set 
by analysts’ forecasts. We investigate whether managers aim to ‘‘meet or 
beat” analysts’ forecasts and examine the injuence of analysts’ forecast 
dispersion on this aim. Our results are consistent with managers aligning 
earnings with market expectations established by analysts’ forecasts. Ad- 
ditionally, our evidence is consistent with managers behaving as though 
they have greater incentives to increase income in settings where the dis- 
persion in analysts’ forecasts is low. 
1. Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that there are strong incentives to achieve ana- 
lysts’ earnings forecasts to protect a company’s stock price. As mentioned in a 
Wall Street Journal column, “The rarest commodity in the stock market these days 
is certainty, and it doesn’t come cheap. In the past . . . panicky momentum investors 
have mercilessly pummeled any stocks with the slightest earnings disappointment. 
There are examples every day of stocks that go down 25% to 50% because they 
missed [analysts’] earnings estimates by a few cents” (WSJ [1997, pp. C1, C21). 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has noticed this trend, and in a speech 
at New York University’s Center for Law and Business (September 28, 1998), SEC 
chairman Arthur Levitt noted: 
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Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street 
earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business practices. Too 
many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of 
nods and winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus estimates and project a smooth 
earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful repre- 
sentation. As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality 
of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may 
be giving way to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.” . . . 
“While the problem of earnings manipulation is not new, it has swelled in a 
market that is unforgiving of companies that m i s s  their estimates. I recently 
read of one major U.S. company, that failed to meet its so-called “numbers” 
by one penny, and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day. 
These remarks by the SEC chairman suggest that managers are concerned 
about failing to meet earnings expectations set by analysts’ forecasts and that 
“earnings manipulation” is a tool they can use to ensure markets are not disap- 
pointed. DeFond and Park (1997) present evidence that indicates managers utilize 
their discretion to smooth reported income between accounting periods by relying 
on the earnings expectation set by analysts’ forecasts regarding the next period’s 
earnings.’ However, this motivation for adjusting reported earnings does not ad- 
dress Chairman Levitt’s concerns regarding earnings management (manipulation) 
to achieve the current analysts’ earnings forecast. Chairman Levitt’s speculation 
that managers can manipulate reported earnings is supported by existing research 
that indicates managers can effectively utilize their discretion to achieve targeted 
earnings levels.2 
The purpose of this study is to investigate managers’ desire to “meet or beat” 
the current period’s analysts’ earnings forecasts. We also investigate managers’ 
incentives to increase reported earnings when the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
is low. Our evidence indicates that these motivations are important and influence 
the magnitude of earnings management. We find that earnings are managed to align 
with market expectations (as determined by analysts’ forecasts). Additionally, when 
the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts is low, managers make greater at- 
tempts to “meet or beat” analysts’ forecasts and exhibit a consistent desire to 
increase reported earnings. Our results are robust with respect to model specifica- 
tion and hold up well under tests for alternative incentives to manage earnings. 
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature on earnings management. 
We empirically examine managers’ use of their reporting discretion to “meet or 
1. DeFond and Park’s (1997) findings indicate that managers use their discretion in adjusting 
reported earnings to increase earnings in the current period when next year’s earnings are expected to 
be “good” and current performance is “bad.” 
2. Existing research indicates that earnings are managed to avoid debt covenant violations 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994]), to reduce reported earnings prior to the announcement of a manage- 
ment buyout proposal (Perry and Williams [1994]), and to make income-decreasing reporting decisions 
during import relief investigations (Jones [1991]). 
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beat” analysts’ forecasts. We investigate the degree to which ex ante earnings 
expectations (as measured by analysts’ forecasts) influence earnings management. 
This is in contrast to Matsumoto (1999), where a firm’s propensity to avoid neg- 
ative earnings surprises is facilitated by guiding analysts’ forecasts before they are 
made. We take analysts’ forecasts as given and examine the incentives of managers 
to achieve those forecasts once they are made public. This is a subtle but important 
difference between our paper and hers. Second, we examine the effect of analysts’ 
forecast dispersion on management’s incentives with respect to reported earnings. 
To date, the degree of analysts’ forecast dispersion has not been examined as a 
possible motivation for earnings management. Our results indicate that both the 
level and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts affect management’s financial reporting 
decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 presents the 
theory and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 details the data selection criteria and 
outlines the research design. Sections 4 and 5 present the results and supplemental 
analyses, respectively. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Conventional wisdom maintains that analysts’ forecasts are a key source of 
information used by investors when developing expectations of future earnings (Ip 
[1997]; Fox [1997]). Analysts’ forecasts provide input to many of the market’s 
decisions. For example, individual investors consider analysts’ forecasts to be 
among the most influential sources of information for investment decision making 
(Hirst et al. [ 1995]), including the determination of future stock prices (Dowen and 
Bauman [ 19911). Managers generally prefer to cooperate with analysts to dissem- 
inate earnings information to investors (Ajinkya and Gift [ 19841; Lees [ 1981]).3.4 
Personal and direct contact with management, along with their assimilation of ec- 
onomic and industry specific components affecting firm value, enables analysts to 
monitor the credibility of managers’ disclosures (King et al. [1990]). 
The suitability of using analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for market expectations 
and the costs associated with disappointing the market by failing to meet earnings 
expectations (i.e., negative stock price reactions) are well established in the ac- 
counting literature (e.g., Brown [1993]). The mean of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
is often used as a surrogate for unobservable investor earnings expectations and 
consistently outperforms other market expectation proxies (e.g., time-series 
models). 
3. Analysts base their forecasts on information obtained from (in order of importance) (1) in- 
terviews with management, (2) publicly reported financial statements, (3) annual and quarterly reports, 
(4) management forecasts (if available), ( 5 )  formal presentations by company executives, (6) forecasts 
by other analysts, and (7) press releases concerning the company (Lees [1981]). 
4. Lees (1981) notes many companies make special efforts to assist analysts by preparing fact- 
books containing statistics on company performance, granting interviews to an individual or groups of 
analysts, and making presentations at analysts’ meetings. 
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The extant literature examines many incentives for managers to reduce ana- 
lysts’ forecast errors. Managers fear costly legal actions by shareholders when the 
market’s earnings expectations are not met (Kasznik [1999]; Francis et al. [1995]; 
Skinner [1994]). These costs are increasing in the magnitude of forecast error (Fran- 
cis et al. [1995]). Trueman (1986) proposes that managers might use analysts’ 
forecasts as a way to avoid lawsuits arising from earnings that deviate significantly 
from expectations. He suggests that if investors can infer the actual source of the 
analysts’ forecast information, managers can successfully convey new information 
about their firm’s economic condition to investors through analysts’ forecasts. Man- 
agers also have incentives to keep bad news, or earnings disappointments, from 
happening (see Walther and Willis [1999]; Skinner [1994]; Ajinkya and Gift 
[1984]). 
We first examine the setting where premanaged earnings are below analysts’ 
forecasts and subsequently evaluate settings where premanaged earnings are above 
analysts’ forecasts. Premanaged earnings are measured as current period earnings 
before discretionary  accrual^.^ When premanaged earnings are below analysts’ fore- 
casts, management’s tenure and reputation (Skinner [ 19941; Fama [ 19801y and 
litigation (Francis et al. [ 19951; Skinner [ 19941; Trueman [ 19861) incentives align 
to provide a strong desire to avoid an earnings disappointment that leads to reduced 
credibility andor potential litigation for failing to update the market with “bad” 
news. Therefore, managers have incentives to increase income to minimize ana- 
lysts’ forecast error. Stated formally (in alternative form): 
H I :  When premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts, management will 
increase income to achieve forecasted earnings levels. 
We also investigate the degree to which dispersion in ex ante beliefs affects 
earnings management. Reduced analysts’ forecast dispersion implies a high degree 
of expectation certainty, which in turn both increases the magnitude of investors’ 
responses to unexpected earnings reports (Lipe [ 19901) and increases management’s 
incentives to ensure the market is not disappointed (Brown [1993]). Atiase and 
Bamber (1994) suggest that predisclosure information asymmetry (measured using 
the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts) helps to explain the relationship between vol- 
ume and price reactions to public disclosures (earnings announcements). A positive 
relationship between trading volume and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is also 
found by Ajinkya et al. (1991). 
The market reacts differently to different degrees of heterogeneity in analysts’ 
forecasts. Imhoff and Lob0 (1992) determine that ex ante uncertainty preceding an 
earnings announcement impacts the magnitude of the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) when earnings are released. Their results indicate that unexpected earnings 
have a greater effect on unexpected stock price changes as analysts’ forecast dis- 
5. The estimation of discretionary accruals is discussed in Section 3. 
6. Fama (1980) suggests that managers with poor track records or eroded credibility will suffer 
reduced compensation in efficient labor markets. 
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persion declines. Therefore, as earnings forecasts become less disperse, managers 
potentially have an increased incentive to meet forecasted earnings figures since 
investors place more value on reported earnings when forecast dispersion is low.’ 
When premanaged earnings are below market expectations, we predict (stated in 
alternative form): 
H2: Management’s desire to increase income will be negatively correlated with 
analysts’ forecast dispersion (as dispersion decreases, management will in- 
crease income to minimize analysts’ forecast error). 
An interesting question arises when one considers the behavior of managers 
in years when premanaged earnings are above analysts’ forecasts. If the firm has 
exceeded market expectations with respect to anticipated earnings, will managers 
decrease income to achieve analysts’ forecasts? Applying Skinner’s (1994) asym- 
metric loss rationale, the incentive to minimize analysts’ forecast errors may not 
apply to settings where premanaged earnings are above analysts’ forecasts. When 
earnings exceed expectations, the market views this as “good news.” This leaves 
management with conflicting incentives. Management can elect to report higher 
earnings to increase stock prices now, or reduce reported earnings to the forecasted 
level. This choice is not related to economic penalties (that do not exist when the 
market is pleasantly surprised), but rather is a result of the nature of accrual ac- 
counting. Accruals that can be managed are not inexhaustible. When a company’s 
earnings exceed market expectations, managers can build up income-increasing 
accrual “reserves” for use in the future (effectively a rationing policy with respect 
to the pool of available accruals). Due to conflicting incentives, we leave this issue 
as an empirical question. 
3. Data and Research Design 
Analyst forecast data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate Sys- 
tem (I/BE/S).* The Compustat 1998 database is the source of all earnings and 
7. Imhoff and Lob0 (1992), Abarbanell et al. (1995). and Barron and Stuerke (1998) present 
two compelling, yet different, explanations for the negative relationship between investor’s reactions to 
unexpected earnings and analysts’ forecast dispersion. Imhoff and Lob0 (1992) examine analysts’ fore- 
cast dispersion preceding earnings announcements and suggest that increased dispersion is reflective of 
“noise” in the financial statements and does not represent fundamental uncertainty. Abarbanell et al. 
(1995) provide an alternative explanation. They show that when analysts’ forecast dispersion increases 
(decreases), investors place less (more) reliance on the analysts’ forecast estimate and rely more (less) 
on private information search activities. This in turn leads to decreased (increased) price reactions to 
subsequent earnings announcements. Barron and Stuerke (1998) find evidence consistent with this prop- 
osition, leading them to suggest that the negative relation between ERCs and analysts’ forecast disper- 
sion that Imhoff and Lob0 report may be consistent with dispersion reflecting uncertainty about a firm’s 
future economic performance. We do not address the cause of the negative relationship that exists 
between analysts’ forecast dispersion and the value relevance of earnings as measured using ERCs (i.e., 
does analysts’ forecast dispersion reflect “noise” in the financial statement generation process or is it 
reflective of fundamental uncertainty?). For our purposes it is sufficient that prior research indicates 
that such a relationship exists. 
8. We use the mean estimate and standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts from the I/B/E/S 
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balance sheet data. We begin by selecting all firms included in the 1998 Compustat 
Industrial and Full Coverage databases that have analysts’ forecast information 
available from I/B/E/S for the years 1986-1997. Financial institutions (with SIC 
codes between 5999 and 7000) are deleted because discretionary accrual estimation 
is problematic for these firms. Elimination of data for firm-years with missing 
observations or less than three analysts’ forecasts provides an initial sample of 
23,986 firm-years. First differencing required during the estimation of discretionary 
accruals, the elimination of industry/year combinations without a sufficient sample 
size for portfolio estimation, and removal of extreme observations9 reduces the 
final sample to 13,532 firm-year observations. 
3.1 Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
Existing studies use numerous methodologies to detect the influence of ac- 
counting choices on reported earnings. These include the examination of individual 
account balances such as bad debt reserves (McNichols and Wilson [1988]) or the 
choice of specific accounting methods (Sweeney [ 19941). Jones (1991) provided 
the initial insight into the measurement of discretionary or abnormal accruals. 
Jones’s technique estimates normal accruals as a function of the change in revenues 
and the level of property, plant, and equipment to control for changes in accruals 
that are due to changes in a firm’s economic condition. By subtracting this value 
from total accruals, an estimate of the discretionary portion of total accruals is 
possible. The Jones model has been modified to adjust for the change in accounts 
receivable (Dechow et al. [ 19951) and has been applied using both time-series (e.g., 
Jones [ 19911) and cross-sectional (DeFond and Jiambalvo [ 19941) estimation 
techniques. 
Earnings management through the discretionary component of accruals is less 
likely to be visible and therefore is more difficult to infer. Healy (1985) notes that 
in comparison to voluntary changes in accounting methods (e.g., changing from 
accelerated to straight-line depreciation), accrual manipulation is a less costly 
means of transfemng earnings between periods. The application of the Jones model 
allows for estimation of discretionary accruals and controls for changes in accruals 
that are due to changes in the firm’s economic condition. 
Consistent with previous studies of earnings management (e.g., Dechow et al. 
[ 1995]), total accruals are computed as: 
(1) TA, = (ACA, - ACL, - ACash, + ASTD, - DepJ, 
History Tape for the month preceding the annual earnings announcement. This improves the accuracy 
of the aggregated forecast data by focusing on the most recent forecast (O’Brien [1988]). For a forecast 
observation to be used, at least three analysts must have made a prediction. 
9. To be consistent with other studies that examine management’s use of discretionary accruals, 
we exclude highly influential observations using the technique proposed by Besley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980). 
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TA = total accruals, 
ACA = change in current assets (Compustat item 4), 
ACL = change in current liabilities (Compustat item 5) ,  
ACash = change in cash and cash equivalents (Compustat item l), 
ASTD = change in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat item 34), 
Dep = depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item 14), 
t = time period. 
Discretionary accruals are measured applying a cross-sectional variation of the 
Jones (1991) model, as shown in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). Compared to time 
series based estimation techniques, the industry-level estimation allowed by the 
cross-sectional approach increases the number of observations used for parameter 
estimation, controls for industry year variation, and is better specified (Subraman- 
yam 1996)." The time-series approach assumes the parameter estimates are sta- 
tionary over the time period investigated. This is not a constraint in the 
cross-sectional model. Our application of the cross-sectional Jones model enables 
our results to be compared with the existing literature without the constraint of 
controlling for a different estimation process for discretionary accruals. 
The model is applied as 
where 
TA,, = total accruals for sample firm i in year t, 
A,,-l = total assets for sample firm i in year t - 1, 
ARev,, = change in net revenues for sample firm i in year t, 
PPE,, = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm i in year t, 
err = error term for sample firm i in year t. 
Ordinary least squares is used to obtain industry-specific estimates of the co- 
efficients (u,, bl,, and b2,) in eq. (2) for each two-digit SIC industry, by year." The 
change in revenue is included because changes in working capital accounts (part 
of total accruals) are affected by changes in revenue. Property, plant and equipment 
is used to control for the portion of total accruals related to the nondiscretionary 
depreciation expense. Discretionary accruals (DA) represent the portion of total 
accruals that are not explained by normal operating activities and are measured as 
the residual (e,,) from the above regression. 
10. This cross-sectional version of the Jones model has been applied extensively in earnings 
management research (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994]; Subramanyam [1996]; DeFond and Park 
[1997]; Wu [1997]; Becker et al. [1998]; DeFond and Subramanyam [1998]). 
11 .  We do not use an industry indicator to lighten the notation of the model. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Firms Contained in Both the 
I/B/E/S and Compustat Databases for the Years 1988-1997 Excluding All 
SIC Codes Between 5999 and 7000, Partitioned by Level of Premanaged 
Earnings (PME) 
BELOW ABOVE 
PME< PME> 
Analysts’ Analysts’ 
Variable Mean Median 1% 25% 75% 99% Forecasts Forecasts 
13,532 
-0.034 
0.043 
0.724 
0.09 
1.048 
2,032 
0.124 
0.519 
13,532 
-0.041 
0.05 1 
0.84 
0.094 
0.93 
614 
0.038 
0.533 
-0.256 
-0.389 
-5.4 
-0.345 
-2.19 
32 
0 
-0.089 
-0.075 
0.023 
0.33 
0.045 
0.46 
210 
0.018 
0.373 
0 
0.086 
1.49 
0.15 
1.56 
2,030 
0.091 
0.649 
0.258 
0.231 
5.14 
0.4 
5 
17,350 
1.556 
1.146 
7,704 
-0.005 
0.034 
0.491 
0.05 
1.049 
2,082 
0.134 
0.516 
5,828 
-0.075** 
0.054** 
1.03 1 ** 
0.142** 
1.045 
1,967* 
0.112** 
0.522 
** ABOVE significantly different from BELOW at p < 0.01 (two-tailed t test). 
* ABOVE significantly different from BELOW at p < 0.05 (two-tailed t test). 
Variable definitions: 
TAX, 
ROA,, 
EPS,, 
CASH,, 
AFCST,, 
A,, 
DISP,, 
LEVERAGE,, = total debt divided by stockholders’ equity for sample firm i for year t. 
= total accruals for sample firm i in year t. 
= EPSmotal assets for firm i in year t.  
= EPS for sample firm i in year t. 
= cash flow from operations for sample firm i for year t. 
= analysts’ earnings forecast for sample firm i for year t .  
= total assets for sample firm i for year t (in millions of dollars). 
= measure of analysts’ forecast dispersion (calculated in the last month), a summary 
forecast measure was available from I/B/E/S before the annual earnings announcement. 
4. Results 
The descriptive statistics for sample firms reported in Table 1 indicate that 
firms with premanaged earnings below analysts’ forecasts (BELOW firms) gener- 
ally report lower levels of return on assets, earnings per share, and cash flows from 
operations than ABOVE firms. In addition, these firms are slightly larger and have 
more dispersion in analysts’ forecasts when compared to firms with premanaged 
earnings above analysts’ forecasts (ABOVE firms). The significant differences in 
cash flows from operations (CASH) and operating performance (ROA and EPS) 
are of concern. The CASH (Shivakumar [1996]) and relative level of operating 
performance variables (Dechow et al. [1995]) have been shown to affect the esti- 
mation of discretionary accruals. Accordingly, these differences are controlled for 
in our subsequent analysis. There is no significant difference in the level of the 
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TABLE 2 
Analysis of Discretionary Accruals 
Based on the Level of Premanaged 
Earnings Compared to 
Analysts’ Forecasts 
Mean Discretionary Accrual’ 
BELOW’ 
ABOVE 
Quartiles3 
BELOW 
Q1 
4 2  
Q3 
44 
Q1 
4 2  
4 3  
Q4 
Q1 
Q2 
4 3  
44 
ABOVE 
ALL 
n = 13,532 
0.033* 
-0.047* 
0.039* 
0.035* 
0.035* 
0.023* 
I 
-0.040* 
-0.043* 
-0.044* 
-0.060* 
I 
-0.01 1* 
* Significantly different from zero at 0.01. 
’ Represents the amount of discretionary ac- 
cruals utilized by management [see eq. (2)]. 
* BELOW (ABOVE) indicates premanaged 
earnings are below (above) analysts’ forecasts. ALL 
represented the entire sample of ABOVE and BE- 
LOW firms. 
3Q1 (Q4) represents the least (greatest) 
amount of analysts’ forecast dispersion. 
I Cell values are not statistically different us- 
ing a family-wise confidence coefficient of 95% ap- 
plying the Tukey procedure. 
mean analysts’ forecast or financial leverage between the BELOW and ABOVE 
groups. 
4.1 Univariate Test of Hypotheses 
Mean levels of discretionary accruals are reported in Table 2 for the total 
sample based on the level of premanaged earnings (above or below the analysts’ 
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forecast). We hypothesize that when premanaged earnings are below analysts’ fore- 
casts, discretionary accruals will be positive. We test this by determining if mean 
discretionary accruals are significantly positive. The results in Table 2 indicate 
strong support for H,. When premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts, 
discretionary accruals are significantly positive (BELOW = 0.033). We also find 
that when premanaged earnings are above analysts’ forecasts, discretionary accruals 
are significantly negative (ABOVE = -0.047). 
To determine if managers’ use of discretionary accruals is affected by the 
degree of analysts’ forecast dispersion, a dispersion variable (DISP) is calculated, 
ex post, to measure the variation in analysts’ forecasts. DISP is calculated for the 
month preceding the annual earnings announcement for each firm-year as the stan- 
dard deviation across analysts’ forecasts divided by the absolute value of the mean 
EPS forecast during the month. This standardization renders DISP scale-free across 
firms and is similarly defined in Comiskey et al. (1987), Elliott and Philbrick 
(1990), and Ajinkya et al. (1991).” If analysts’ forecast dispersion affects man- 
agers’ use of income-increasing discretionary accruals, as predicted in H,, we ex- 
pect Q1 > 4 2  > 4 3  > 4 4  (where Q1 [Q4] represents the estimated mean 
discretionary accrual value for the quartile of companies with the lowest [greatest] 
analysts’ forecast dispersion) for BELOW firms. The Tukey procedure (Neter, Was- 
serman, and Kutner 1985) applied with a family confidence coefficient of 95 per- 
cent for BELOW firms indicates that Q1 = 4 2  = 4 3  > 4 4  supporting H,. For 
ABOVE firms, Q1 = 42 = 4 3  > 44. The analysis of firms without the ABOVE/ 
BELOW dichotomy indicates that Q1 > 43 > 44 and 4 2  > 44. Overall, this 
analysis indicates that as analysts move toward agreement regarding expected earn- 
ings (as evidenced by reduced analysts’ forecast dispersion) managers consistently 
use discretionary accruals to increase reported earnings. 
4.2 Multivariate Test of Hypotheses 
To examine the robustness of our results with respect to incentives to manage 
earnings other than to meet analysts’ forecasts, OLS estimates were obtained from 
the following regression: l3  
12. If both the timing of forecast updates and the information available to analysts in making 
their updates varies across analysts, then differences in EPS estimates will be due in part to differential 
information available to analysts at different times. This will add noise to the DISP measure and make 
it more difficult to support our hypotheses. 
13. The summary I/B/E/S forecast measures from the History Tapes have been called into question 
in settings investigating forecast revision after earnings announcements (Barron and Stuerke [ 19981). 
We investigate earnings management before the earnings announcement. However, to ensure the ro- 
bustness of our results additional analyses were performed using analysts’ forecast information from 
the fourth fiscal quarter (I/B/E/S History Tapes), the last earnings forecast from an individual analyst 
before the annual earnings announcement (I/B/E/S Daily Detail Tape), and the average of the last 
forecast from each individual analyst (VB/E/S Daily Detail Tape) made after a company’s fiscal year- 
end but before the annual earnings announcement, to determine the PMBAF and DISP measures. Each 
approach produced results that are qualitatively similar to the results reported. 
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DA,, = b, + b,(DISP,,) + b,(PMBAF,,) + b,(PMBAF,, * DISP,,) 
+ b,(CASHWGT,,) + b,(LEVERAGE,,) + b,(LOGTA,,) 
+ b,(BIGSIX,,) + b,(PYDA,,) + b,(NLUP,,) + e,,, (3) 
where 
DA,, 
DISP,, 
= estimated discretionary accruals from eq. (2); 
= measure of analysts’ forecast dispersion (calculated in the last 
month), a summary forecast measure was available from I/B/E/S 
before the annual earnings announcement; 
PMBAF,, = this variable is coded 1 (0) when premanaged earnings are below 
(above) the analysts’ forecast; 
CASHWGT,, = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of period total 
asset balance; 
LEVERAGE,, = total debt divided by stockholders’ equity; 
LOGTA,, 
BIGSIX,, 
PYBA,, 
NLUP,, 
= the log of total assets; 
= this variable is coded l(0) if the company used a Big Six (or 
non-Big Six) auditor; 
= the discretionary accrual from the prior year; and 
= this variable is coded 1 (0) if the current year’s premanaged earn- 
ings exceed the prior year’s reported net income. 
A significant negative association exists between operating cash flows and total 
accruals that influences the estimation of discretionary accruals (Shivakumar 
[ 19961). To control for this influence on the measurement of discretionary accruals 
the variable CASH-WGT is incorporated in the model. Managers who are close 
to debt covenant violations have incentives to take income-increasing actions to 
defer or avoid the costs of a breach (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]; Healy and 
Palepu [1990]; DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994]) or to reduce earnings in the face of 
contractual negotiations (DeAngelo et al. [1994]). To control for the effects of debt 
on management’s reporting decisions we use LEVERAGE as a control variable. 
To control for firm size, which is considered a proxy for the amount of avail- 
able information about a firm’s financial position (Chaney and Jeter [1992]; Lob0 
and Mahmoud [1989]), we include the log of total assets (LOGTA) in the regres- 
sion. The variable BIGSIX controls for the ability of Big Six auditors to constrain 
management’s use of discretionary accruals (Becker et al. [1998]). Prior year dis- 
cretionary accruals (PY-DA) are included to control for the reversing nature of 
accruals (Dechow [1994]). Finally, we include the variable NI-UP to capture com- 
pany incentives related to prior period reported income (Burgstahler and Dichev 
[ 1 9971). 
Our predictions are as follows. The coefficient on PMBAF is expected to be 
positive, indicating managers’ desire to reduce or eliminate negative analysts’ fore- 
cast error (in support of H,) .  A negative coefficient on DISP * PMBAF indicates 
that managers increase reported income as analysts’ forecast dispersion lessens, 
when premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts (in support of H,). For 
firms with premanaged earnings above analysts’ forecasts, conflicting managerial 
382 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
incentives preclude a definitive prediction for DISP (the influence of analysts’ fore- 
cast dispersion on managers’ use of discretionary accruals when premanaged earn- 
ings are above analysts’ forecasts). A negative sign is expected on CASH-WGT 
due to the negative correlation between cash flows and accruals. LEVERAGE is 
consistently negative and LOGTA is consistently positive in prior applications of 
the cross-sectional Jones model (e.g., Becker et al. [1998]) and we have no reason 
to predict otherwise for our data. Big Six auditors reduce the use of discretion- 
ary accruals by management (Becker et al. [1998]) suggesting a negative sign 
on BIGSIX. The reversing nature of accruals will lead to a negative sign on 
PY-DA. The sign on NI-UP will be negative if managers use discretionary ac- 
cruals to decrease reported income when prior year earnings levels have already 
been attained. 
4.3 Multivariate Results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Eq. (3). We report the predicted sign 
of the coefficients, the estimated coefficients and their significance level based on 
the White (1980) adjusted t statistic, the adjusted RZ, and F statistics for the model. 
When premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts managers use income 
increasing discretionary accruals to increase reported earnings (PMBAF = 0.059, 
p < 0.01) when compared to firms with premanaged earnings above analysts’ 
forecasts. This supports our prediction (Hi) that when premanaged earnings are 
below analysts’ forecasts, managers use discretionary accruals to increase reported 
earnings. 
As analysts’ dispersion decreases (DISP becomes smaller), managers consis- 
tently increase their use of income-increasing discretionary accruals (DISP = 
-0.017, p < 0.01, PMBAF * DISP = 0.002, p > 0.10) irrespective of premanaged 
earnings levels. Collectively, these results indicate that managers consistently in- 
crease reported earnings when analysts are in agreement. This provides support for 
H,, but also indicates that when premanaged earnings are above analysts’ forecasts, 
managers increase reported earnings in response to the decrease in analysts’ forecast 
dispersion. The control variables are all significant, with the exception of PY-DA 
and are signed in the proper dire~ti0n.I~ Overall the evidence from our primary 
14. An additional influence on management’s utilization of discretionary accruals is the presence 
of a management forecast of earnings (Kasznik [1999]). To test the influence of management earnings 
forecasts on our results, we identified 800 sample firms that issued management earnings forecasts 
(4,055 sample firms did not issue management forecasts during this time period) for the years 1983- 
1987 (from the data set used in Baginski and Hassell [1997]). An analysis for this time period using 
eq. (3) while incorporating an indicator variable for the presence of a management forecast does not 
qualitatively affect our reported results. This demonstrates that the issuance of management forecasts 
does not significantly reduce the influence of the level and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on man- 
agement’s use of discretionary accruals. This is consistent with Sansing (1992), who shows that the 
presence of analysts’ forecasts reduces the value relevance of management forecasts. While the Baginski 
and Hassell (1997) management forecast data do not allow comparison across our reported sample 
period, there is no reason to believe that the results for our time period would be qualitatively different. 
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TABLE 3 
Earnings Management Activity: OLS Regressions of Discretionary Accruals 
on Levels of Premanaged Accrual Earnings, Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion, 
and Control Variables 
Predicted 
Variable Sign Coefficient 
Intercept 
DISP,, 
PMBAF,, 
PMBAF,, * DISP,, 
CASH-WGT,, 
LEVERAGE,, 
LOGTA,, 
BIGSIX,, 
PY-DA,, 
NLUP,, 
n 
F value 
Prz > F 
R 
-0.012*** 
-0.017*** 
0.059*** 
0.002 
-0.135*** 
-0.035*** 
0.003*** 
0.003 
- 0.007 * * 
-0.013*** 
13,532 
925.41 
o.Ooo1 
0.381 
Note: Significant at 0.01(***), 0.05(**), and 0.10(*) using White’s t (1980). 
Model: 
DA, = b,, + b,(DISP,,) + b,(PMBAF,,) 
+ b,(PMBAF, * DISP,,) + b,(CASH-WGT,,) 
+ b,(LEVERAGE,,) + b,(LOGTA,) 
+ b,(BIGSIX,,) + b,(PY-DA,,) + b,(NI-UP,,) 
+ ei, 
where 
DA,, 
DISP, 
= estimated discretionary accruals from Equation (2); 
= measure of analysts’ forecast dispersion (calculated in the last month), a summary 
forecast measure was available from vB/E/S before the annual earnings 
announcement; 
= this variable is coded 1 (0) when premanaged earnings are below (above) the analysts’ 
forecast; 
PMBAF,, 
CASH-WGT, = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of period total asset balance; 
LEVERAGE,, = total debt divided by stockholders’ equity; 
LOGTA,, 
BIGSIX,, 
PY-DA, 
NI-UP, 
= the log of total assets; 
= this variable is coded l(0) if the company used a Big Six (or non-Big Six) auditor; 
= discretionary accrual from the prior year; 
= this variable is coded 1 (0) if the current year’s premanaged earnings exceed the prior 
year’s reported net income. 
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analysis suggests that managers’ discretionary financial reporting decisions are af- 
fected by the level and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
5. Supplemental Analyses 
To be consistent with the recent literature on the measurement of discretionary 
accruals we apply the cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Shivakumar 
(1996) shows that the cross-sectional version of the Jones model is biased for 
extreme levels of cash flows. Therefore, we control for the level of cash flows in 
our primary analysis. Dechow et al. (1995) find that the time-series version of the 
Jones model for estimating discretionary accruals is well specified in a random 
sample of firm-years, but that it is biased in samples with extreme financial per- 
formance. Discretionary accrual estimates tend to be biased upward for firms re- 
porting unusually high earnings and biased downward for firms reporting unusually 
low earnings. We control for this potential bias (that might also affect the cross- 
sectional estimation technique) by incorporating indicator variables representing 
firms with return on assets (ROA) in the upper and lower 10 percent of the entire 
sample of firms in an untabulated analysis. The results indicate an improved R2 for 
our model of 0.449 (vs. 0.381 in Table 3) indicating that extreme levels of ROA 
help explain the variance in our measure of discretionary accruals. Importantly, the 
parameter estimates on the hypothesized and control variables are qualitatively 
similar to our reported results. This indicates that our results are not driven by the 
inclusion of firms with extreme financial performance. l5 
Another concern is that a selection bias in our portfolio formation (PMBAF 
= 1,O) might be influencing our reported results. Specifically, discretionary accruals 
(measured with error) affect the portfolio assignments, and also serve as the de- 
pendent variable. McNichols and Wilson (1988) note that earnings management 
tests can produce biased results when the partitioning variable is correlated with 
the dependent variable. This design issue is also raised in Gaver et al. (1995), 
DeFond and Park (1997), and Lim and Lustgarten (1998). 
The effects of this potential bias on our findings can be reduced if we partition 
the data using a measure of relative performance that is not mechanically related 
to our estimate of discretionary accruals. Such a partition would essentially be an 
“instrumental variable” that surrogates for premanaged earnings. An instrumental 
variable is a variable that is correlated with the variable of interest, but uncorrelated 
with the measurement error that may be present in the variable of interest. Because 
cash flows are expected to be correlated with performance but are measured in- 
dependently of total accruals, they are not affected by the measurement error that 
results from the estimation of discretionary accruals. To test the sensitivity of our 
results to this potential bias, we replicate the analysis in Tables 2 and 3 using cash 
flows and lagged cash flows, by industry and year, as instruments to determine the 
15. An additional analysis using the upper and lower 10 percent of EPS produces qualitatively 
similar results. 
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predicted value on which to partition current performance. The results of this anal- 
ysis (not reported) continue to support our predictions. 
By controlling for the potential correlation between our partitioning variable 
(PMBAF) and the measurement error associated with our estimation of discretion- 
ary accruals, we have shown that our reported results are robust with respect to 
model specification and are not adversely influenced by the potential for correlation 
between the predicted discretionary accrual and the portfolio assignment. The sig- 
nificant results in the hypothesized direction, obtained with the instrumental vari- 
ables analysis, indicate that our reported results are not solely determined by the 
potential negative correlation bias of the model. l6 
To ensure that within-firm dependencies are not significantly influencing our 
reported results we perform an analysis similar to Imhoff, Lipe, and Wright (1993). 
They note that using multiple observations for each firm could overstate the sig- 
nificance levels of pooled time-series cross-sectional tests. The use of intertemporal 
means of the variables for each firm avoids this concern. Our untabulated analysis 
indicates that the use of multiple observations per firm is not systematically over- 
stating our significance levels on the hypothesized variables of interest. PMBAF 
and DISP remain significant at 0.01 and signed in the proper direction. 
The previous analyses control for potential specification and measurement 
problems that may arise by using our measure of discretionary accruals to partition 
the data into firms below/above analysts’ forecasts, the estimation of discretionary 
accruals, and the potential effects of within-firm dependencies. A more fundamental 
concern regarding the estimation process is raised in Dechow et al. (1997). Their 
analysis indicates that existing techniques for measuring earnings management 
(e.g., the Jones model) are likely to misclassify some nondiscretionary accruals as 
being discretionary, thereby overstating the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
Guay et al. (1996) likewise fail to find conclusive evidence that the estimation of 
discretionary accruals is precise. 
Since the use of discretionary accruals might be problematic, we perform ad- 
ditional analyses that do not rely on the estimation of discretionary accruals. Spe- 
cifically, to avoid using discretionary accruals altogether we form scaled deviations 
of earnings from forecasts (reported EPS - mean analysts’ forecasted EPS)/(assets 
per share) and create histogram~.’~ If H ,  is true, we expect to see more firms in 
the interval just above zero (because firms manage earnings to be equal to or just 
above forecasts). We expect to see fewer firms in the interval just below zero (firms 
that were within striking distance of the goal but chose not to achieve it). If earnings 
management exists, the histogram should have a sharp discontinuity around zero. 
To test the significance of the hypothesized relationship between earnings man- 
16. Additionally, we performed an analysis of eq. (3) without the PMBAF term. This eliminates 
the potential measurement error problems associated with our partitioning variable. This analysis also 
produces a significantly negative coefficient on DISP (-0.013, p < 0.001). Furthermore, the application 
of Shivakumar’s (1996) discretionary accrual estimation technique that adjusts for differential levels of 
cash flows does not qualitatively affect our reported results. 
17. Analyses using unscaled analysts’ forecast error produced qualitatively similar, results. 
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agement and analysts’ forecasts, we adapt the approach of Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and construct a statistical test of the distribution of analysts’ forecast errors. 
Consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev we avoid assumptions regarding the form 
of analysts’ forecast error distribution. Therefore, under the null hypotheses of no 
earnings management, the cross-sectional distribution of analysts’ forecast errors 
should be relatively smooth. The test statistic is the difference between the actual 
number of observations in the interval and the expected number of observations in 
the interval, divided by the estimated standard deviation of the difference.I8 
The expected number of observations in any interval is the average of the 
number of observations in the adjacent intervals (Le., the expected number of ob- 
servations in the interval immediately to the right of zero is the average of the 
number of observations in the interval to the immediate left of zero and the second 
interval to the right of zero). As noted by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the 
standardized differences in the intervals immediately to the left and right of zero 
will be simultaneously affected and are not independent; therefore, we will con- 
centrate on the results for the interval immediately to the left of zero (for infor- 
mation purposes we report standardized differences to the right of zero in 
parentheses). If the hypothesized earnings management does not exist, the stan- 
dardized differences should be distributed approximately normal with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1, and the number of firms in the intervals surrounding zero 
should not be significantly different from each other. 
Figure 1 represents a histogram of the distribution of analysts’ forecast errors 
scaled by total assets per share. Histogram interval widths are 0.0025 for the range 
of -0.05 to +0.05.19 The figure shows a sharply single-peaked distribution, with 
a substantial increase in observations directly to the right of zero. The standardized 
difference (Z statistic) for the interval immediately to the left of zero is -9.73, p 
< 0.001 (the standardized difference to the right of zero is 43.71, p < 0.001). This 
is consistent with earnings management designed to reach or slightly exceed ana- 
lysts’ forecast estimates. Visual inspection indicates a tight distribution around zero. 
This provides further confirmation that earnings are managed toward analysts’ fore- 
casts as indicated in our previous analysis.*’ 
To investigate the influence of analysts’ forecast dispersion on earnings man- 
agement, we categorize the observations based on our measure of dispersion, DISP. 
18. The number of observations in an interval is a random variable that is approximately inde- 
pendent of the number of adjacent intervals. Therefore, the variance of the difference between the 
observed and expected number of observations is approximately the sum of the variance of the com- 
ponents of the difference. Denoting the probability that an observation will fall into the interval i by 
p ,  and the total number of observations as N, the variance of the difference between the observed and 
expected number of observations for interval i is approximately Np,(l - p,) + Vi [ N @ , - ,  + p , , , )  (1 
- p Z - ]  - P , + ~ ) ]  (see Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]). 
19. We use the same scale adopted by Burgstabler and Dichev (1997) to enable comparison of 
our results. 
20. A similar analysis by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) investigating earnings management to 
ensure an increase in reported net income over the prior period produced a markedly more disperse 
pattern of standardized differences. 
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Analysts’ Forecast Error Scaled by Assets per Share for 
-0.05 < Analysts’ Forecast Error < 0.05 and Interval Width = 0.0025 
6 
C 
Analysts’ Forecast Error 
Notes 
The figure shows the empirical distribution of analysts’ forecast error (reported 
earnings less analysts’ mean earnings forecasts) scaled by total assets per share as 
of the beginning of the year. The distribution interval widths are 0.0025. For 
example, the first interval to the right of zero contains all scaled analysts’ forecast 
errors in the interval [O.oooO, 0.00253, the second interval contains [0.0025, 
0.00501, and so on. The vertical axis labeled frequency represents the number of 
observations in each interval. 
Figure 2 shows the resulting distributions of analysts’ forecast errors. Panels A and 
B provide evidence of earnings management to achieve analysts’ forecasts in the 
first (Z = - 11.98 [41.37]) and second (Z = -4.47 [24.84]) quartiles. Visual in- 
spection of panels A, B, C, and D clearly indicates that the magnitudes of stan- 
dardized differences are shrinking as analysts’ forecast dispersion increases. The 
fatter tails to the left of zero in panels C and D are consistent with firms potentially 
choosing a “big bath” reporting strategy in periods when earnings are low and 
there is greater uncertainty regarding expected earnings levels. These results dem- 
onstrate that managers prefer to present pleasant earnings “surprises” as opposed 
to earnings ‘‘disappointments,’ ’ especially when analysts are in agreement regard- 
ing expected earnings. 
A caveat to our reported results is that the desire to “meet or beat” analysts’ 
forecasts can be achieved by ensuring that analysts’ forecasts are equal to or below 
manager’s expectations of future earnings by privately or publicly communicating 
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FIGURE 2 
Distribution of Analysts’ Forecast Error Scaled by Assets per Share for 
-0.05 < Analysts’ Forecast Error < 0.05 and Interval Width = 0.0025 
Panel A 
Forecast Dispersion in First 
Quartile 
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n 
4.05 4.025 0 0.025 0.05 
Analysts’ Forecast Emr 
Panel C 
Forecast Dispersion in Third 
Quartile 
4.05 4.025 0 0,025 0.05 
Analysts’ Forecast E m  
Panel B 
Forecast Dispersion in Second 
Quartile 
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m 
g mo 
f g 1wo 
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0 
4.05 4.025 0 0.025 0.05 
Analysts’ Forecast Emr 
Panel D 
Forecast Dispersion in Fourth 
Quartile 
Notes 
The figure shows four empirical distributions of analysts’ forecast errors scaled by 
total assets per share, categorized according to analysts’ forecast dispersion. Panel 
A (D) shows the distribution for firms with the lowest (highest) level of analysts’ 
forecast dispersion. 
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earnings estimates to analysts:’ by managing earnings to ensure that analysts’ 
forecasts are met, or both. Therefore the results depicted in Figures 1 and 2 could 
be representative of the use of one or a combination of these techniques. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that large changes in earnings expectations are easier to accom- 
plish through ex ante adjustment of earnings expectations. Our results suggest that 
the use of discretionary accruals allow managers to “meet or beat” analysts’ fore- 
casts once they are set. 
By controlling for the potential correlation problem with our partitioning 
method and the potential measurement error associated with our estimation of dis- 
cretionary accruals, we demonstrate that our reported results are robust with respect 
to model specification and are not adversely influenced by our model’s potential 
inability to accurately estimate nondiscretionary accruals. 
6. Conclusion 
SEC Chairman Levitt has expressed concerns about the use of earnings man- 
agement to report earnings consistent with analysts’ forecasts. By reducing earnings 
surprises, management attempts to increase stock price while developing a repu- 
tation for predictability and dependability thereby reducing investor, customer, and 
employee dissonance. 
This study is the first to present empirical evidence of the effect of analysts’ 
forecasts on earnings management. We hypothesize that managers have incentives 
to use their discretion over accounting accruals to eliminate negative earnings sur- 
prises. We predict that managers will move earnings toward analysts’ forecasts 
when premanaged earnings are below market expectations. This prediction is sup- 
ported. When premanaged earnings exceed analysts’ forecasts, managers have con- 
flicting incentives with respect to the use of discretionary accruals. On one hand, 
there is an incentive to “store up” discretionary accruals for future periods by 
employing income-decreasing accruals (thereby reducing analysts’ forecast errors). 
Alternatively, there exists an incentive to preserve a positive earnings surprise in 
expectation of a favorable stock price reaction. We find evidence consistent with 
the incentive to “store up” discretionary accruals. 
We are the first to investigate the degree to which ex ante earnings expectation 
beliefs, measured using analysts’ forecast dispersion, affect management’s use of 
discretionary accruals. We find that as the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
decreases, managers utilize discretionary accruals to increase reported earnings. 
This applies to settings where premanaged earnings are both below and above 
analysts’ forecasts. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that managers 
21. Matsumoto (1999) provides evidence that managers appear to influence analysts’ forecasts 
before an earnings announcement to ensure that earnings estimates are met. Barron and Stuerke (1998) 
suggest disclosures made by management directly to analysts are possibly attempts to mitigate investor 
uncertainty after an earnings announcement. 
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use discretionary accruals to align earnings with market expectations and increase 
income when the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is low. 
Managers can use their discretion over reported accrual balances to improve 
the value relevance of reported earnings (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman [1986]) or 
they can use their discretion opportunistically. The latter is a specific concern of 
SEC Chairman Levitt since such practices reduce the quality of reported earnings. 
Lynn Turner, chief accountant of the SEC, notes that “One of the reasons US 
capital markets have been cited as the best in the world is the high quality and 
integrity of the financial reporting system in the United States” (SEC Chief Ac- 
countant’s Letter to AICPA on Auditing and Financial Reporting Concerns, Oc- 
tober 9, 1998). Our research provides the initial insight into the influence of 
analysts’ forecasts on earnings management and confirms Chairman Levitt’ s sus- 
picion that this practice is effective and widespread. Future research regarding this 
relationship should address the specific accounting “gimmicks” (e.g., the abuse of 
“materiality”) noted by SEC Chairman Levitt in his speech at NYU’s Center for 
Law and Business (September 28, 1998) and their influence on earnings manage- 
ment to achieve analysts’ forecasts. 
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